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1. Introduction and Preliminaries
hl this paper we consider a subset of the imputation set for cooperative TU games, and examine
its properties.
An n-person cooperative game with side payments (abbreviated as a game) is an ordered pair
(N. $v$ ), where $N=\{1,2, \ldots, n\}$ is the set of players and $v$ , called the characteristic fimction. isa real-valued functim on the power set of $N$ , satisfying $v(\emptyset)=0$ . For simpliclty we express a
game $(N, v)$ as $v$ . A subset of $N$ is called a coalition. For any set $Z,$ $|Z|$ denotes the cardinality
of $Z$ . For $S\subseteq N$ and $x\in R^{N}$ , we define $x(S)= \sum_{i\epsilon s}x_{i}$ (if $S\neq\emptyset$ ) and $=0$ (if $S=\emptyset$). A
pre-imputation for a game $v$ is a vector $x\in R^{N}$ that satisfies
$x(N)=v(N)$ . (1.1)
We denote by $\mathcal{P}\mathcal{I}\equiv \mathcal{P}\mathcal{I}(v)$ the set of all pre-imputations for a game $\iota$ . A pre-imputation
$x\in \mathcal{P}\mathcal{I}$ is said to be indimdually rational $if^{1}$
$x_{i}\geq v(i)$ , $\forall t\in N$ . (1.2)
An individually rational pre-imputation is called an imputation. We denote by $\mathcal{I}\equiv \mathcal{I}(v)$ the
set of all imputations for a game $v$ . which we call the imputation set. A pre-imputation $x\in \mathcal{P}\mathcal{I}$
is said to be reasonable if
$x_{i}\leq u_{i}.$ , $\forall i\in N$ , (1.3)
where $\prime u_{i}\equiv u_{i}(v)\equiv n)ax_{i\in S}\{v(S)-v(S\backslash \{i\})\}$ for all $i\in N$ . We denote by $\mathcal{R}\equiv \mathcal{R}(e)$ the set
of all reasonable $pre- i\iota nputations$ for a galne $v$ . For $x,$ $y\in \mathcal{I}$ and for a coalition $S\subset N$ , we say
that $x$ dominates $y$ via $S$ , denoted by $x\succ sy$ , if
$\{\begin{array}{ll}(i) x_{i}>y_{i}, \forall i\in S,(ii) x(S)\leq\iota\prime(S). \end{array}$ (1.4)
For $x,$ $y\in \mathcal{I}$, we say that $x$ dominates $y$ , denoted by $x\succ y$ , if there is an $S$ such that $x$
$\overline{1Fors^{\backslash }implicity_{\backslash }wew\cdot ritev(\{i\}),\cdot v(\{i_{:}j\})}$as $v(i),v(ij)$ .
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dominates $y$ via $S$ . For $\mathcal{X}\subseteq \mathcal{I}$ , we denote by Dom $\mathcal{X}$ the set of all imputations dominated by
some element of X. A set of imputations $\mathcal{X}\subseteq \mathcal{I}$ is called a stable set if it satisfies
$\{\begin{array}{ll}(i) \mathcal{X}\cap Dom\mathcal{X}=\emptyset (internal stability),(ii) \mathcal{X}\cup Dom\mathcal{X}=\mathcal{I} (external stabllity),\end{array}$ (1.5)
The core of a galne $t\rangle$ denoted by $C\equiv C(v)$ , is defined by
$C=\mathcal{I}\backslash Dom\mathcal{I}$ . (1.6)
2. A Subsolution
In this section we define a subset $\mathcal{Q}$ of the imputation set and examine properties of it, We
assume that for every game in this section the imputation set is not empty, $\mathcal{I}(v)\neq\emptyset$ , that is,
$v(N) \geq\sum_{i\in N}v(i)$ . (2.1)
Deflnition. A set $Q\equiv Q(v)\subseteq \mathcal{I}$ is defined by
$Q\equiv$ { $x\in \mathcal{I}:\forall y\in \mathcal{I}$ s.t. $y\succ x$ , $\exists z\in \mathcal{I}$ s.t. $z\succ y$ alld $z\not\simeq x.$ }.
Remark. Let
$Q’\equiv\{x\in \mathcal{I}:\forall y\in \mathcal{I}s.t. y\succ x, \exists\approx\in \mathcal{I}s.t. z\succ y.\}$.
If $C=\emptyset$ then $\mathcal{I}=D_{oI}n\mathcal{I}$ . And so $Q’=\mathcal{I}$ .
Hereafter we fix a game $(N, v)$ .
Proposition 2.1. For a game $v$ , let $\mathcal{X}$ be a stable set. Then X $\subseteq Q$ .
Proof: Let $x\in \mathcal{X}$ and snPpose $y\succ x$ where $y\in \mathcal{I}$ . By the internal stability, we have $y\not\in \mathcal{X}$ ,
and so by the external stability, there exists $z\in \mathcal{X}$ such that $z\succ y$ . By the internal stability,
$z\neq x$ . Hence $x\in Q$ . $\square$
Proposition 2.2. For a gaine $v$ , it holds $Q\subseteq \mathcal{R}$ .
Proof: Let $x\in Q$ and assume $x\not\in \mathcal{R}$ . There exists $i\in N$ such that $x_{i}>u_{i}$ . This implies
$x_{i}>v(N)-v(N\backslash \{i\})$ , which ilnplies $x(N\backslash \{i\})<v(N\backslash \{i\})$ . Hence we can take $y\in \mathcal{I}$ suclx that
$y\succ x$ via $N\backslash \{i\}$ and $y_{i}\geq u;$ . Since $x\in Q$ , there exists $z\in \mathcal{I}$ such that $z\succ y$ via a coalition
$S$ and $z\not\in x$ . If $i\not\in S$ then $z\succ x$ via $S$ , which is a contradiction. If $z(S\backslash i)\leq v(S\backslash i)$ then
$\sim\sim\succ x$ via $S\backslash \{i\}$ . which is a contradiction. So we niust have $i\in S$ and $z(S\backslash \{i\})>v(S\backslash \{i\})$ .
Then $y_{i}<z_{i}=z(S)-z(S\backslash \{i\})<v(S)-v(S\backslash \{i\})\leq u_{i}$ , which is a contradiction. $\square$
132
From this proposition we see that if $v(S\cup\{i\})=v(S)+v(i)$ for all $S$ : $i\not\in S$ and $\tau\in \mathcal{Q}$ then
it lnust hold $x_{j}=v(i)$ since $u_{i}=v(i)$ .
Proposition 2.3. For a game $v$ , it holds $C\subseteq Q\subseteq \mathcal{I}\backslash D_{ol}nC$ .
Proof: By Proposition 2.1. we have $C\subseteq \mathcal{Q}$ . If $\tau\in DomC$ , then there exists $y\in C$ such that
$y\succ x$ atid $y\not\in Donff$ . Hence $x\in Q$ . $\square$
Proposition 2.4. For a game $v$ , the core $C$ is a stable set if and only if $C=Q$ .
Proof: Assume that $C$ is a stable set. By Proposition 2.3, we have $C\subseteq Q$ . Let $x\in Q\backslash C$ .
Since $C$ is a stable set, by the external stability there exists $y\in C$ such that $y\succ x$ . But there
exists no imputation which dominates $y$ because $y$ is in the core. This is a contradiction. Hence
$Q\backslash C=\emptyset$ .
Conversely assume $C=Q$. Since $C\subseteq \mathcal{X}$ for any stable set X, we have $C\subseteq \mathcal{X}\subseteq C$ from
Proposition 2.1. Hence $C$ is a unique stable set. $\square$
Proposition 2.5. Suppose (N. $v$ ) is symmetric, that is. $v$ depends on only the number of
members in a coalition. For every $S\subseteq N.$ let $v(s)=v(S)$ where $s=|S|$ . Assume $v(1)=0$ .
Then
$x^{*} \equiv(\frac{v(n)}{n}, \ldots, \frac{t^{1}(n)}{n})\in Q$.
Proof: Suppose $y\succ x^{*}$ via $S$ and $y\# x^{*}$ via every $T$ such that $T\subset S,$ $T\neq S$ . Then
$y_{j}> \frac{v(n)}{n},\forall j\in S$, $y(S)\leq v(S)$ . and $y(\prime 1^{\cdot}’)>v(T).\forall T\subset S,T\neq S$ .
Then
$v(n)=y(N)=y(N \backslash S)+y(S)>y(N\backslash S)+\frac{|S|}{n}v(n)$ .
This implies $\frac{\iota-|S|}{n}v(n)>y(N\backslash S)$ . and so there exists $i\in N\backslash S$ such that $y_{i}< \frac{v(\mathfrak{n})}{n}$ . For some
$j_{0}\in S$ , let $S^{0}=(S\backslash \{j_{0}\})\cup\{i\}$ . Define $z\in \mathcal{P}\mathcal{I}$ by
$=\{\begin{array}{ll}y_{j}+\epsilon, j\in S^{0}=(S\backslash \{j_{0}\})\cup\{i\};\frac{v(n)}{r\iota}-\delta, j\in N\backslash S^{0}.\end{array}$
Then $y(S^{0})<y(S)\leq v(S)=\cdot v(S^{0})$ , and so for sufficiently small $\epsilon>0$ , we have
$z(S^{0})=y(S^{0})+\epsilon|S^{0}|\leq v(S^{0})$ , $z_{j}>y_{j}.\forall j\in S^{0}$ .
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Hence: $\succ y$ via. $S^{0}$ . $and\approx\neq x^{*}$ since $z_{i}=y_{i}+ \epsilon\leq\frac{\iota(n)}{n}$ and $\approx(T)=y(7’)+\epsilon|T|>y(T)>v(T)$
for every $T\subset S^{()}\backslash \{j_{0}\}$ . It remalns to see that it is possible to find $\epsilon>0$ and $\delta>0$ such that
$z\in \mathcal{I}$ and $\sim\not\in\cdot(S^{0})\leq v(S^{0})$ . $z(N)=v(n)$ if and only if
$y(S^{0} \backslash \{i\})-\frac{|S^{0}|-1}{n}v(n)+\epsilon|S^{0}|=\frac{l’(n)}{n}-y_{i}+\delta(n-|S^{0}|)$. (2.2)
$0< \delta\leq\frac{v(n)}{n}$ if and only if
$\frac{v(n)}{n}-\frac{y(S^{0})}{|S^{0}|}<\epsilon\leq\frac{v(n)-y(S^{0})}{|S^{0}|}$ . (2.3)
$z(S^{0})\leq\cdot v(S^{0})$ if and only if
$\epsilon\leq\frac{v(S^{0})-y(S^{0})}{|S^{0}|}$ . (2.4)
Since $x^{*}(S)<y(S)\leq v(S)=\iota(S^{0})$ , we have $\frac{v(n)}{n}<\frac{v(S^{0})}{|b^{\eta}|}$ Hence there exist $\epsilon$ alid $\delta$ which
satisfy $(2.2)-(2.4)$ .
Proposltion2.5lmplies that $Q\neq\emptyset$ when $v$ is syImnetric.
Definition. (Roth (1976)) A set $\mathcal{Y}\subseteq \mathcal{I}$ is called a subsolution if
$\{\begin{array}{ll}(i)\mathcal{Y}\subseteq \mathcal{I}\backslash Dom\mathcal{Y}, (internal stability)(ii)\mathcal{Y}=\mathcal{I}\backslash Dom(\mathcal{I}\backslash D_{0l}n\mathcal{Y}). \end{array}$
Proposition 2.6. Let $\mathcal{Y}$ be a subsolution. Then $\mathcal{Y}\subseteq Q$ .
Proof: Let $\mathcal{Y}$ be a subsolution and suppose $x\in \mathcal{Y}$ . For any $y\in \mathcal{I}$ such that $y\succ x$ . it holds
$y\not\in \mathcal{Y}$ since $\mathcal{Y}$ is internally stable. So $y\not\in \mathcal{I}\backslash Dom(\mathcal{I}\backslash D_{oI}n\mathcal{Y})$ by the definition of subsolution.
Hence $y\in Dom(\mathcal{I}\backslash D_{oi}\mathcal{Y})$ . This implies that there exists $\sim\sim,$ $\in \mathcal{I}\backslash Dom\mathcal{Y}$ such that $z\succ y$ .
Sinoe $x\not\in Dom(\mathcal{I}\backslash Dom\mathcal{Y})$, it holds that $z\neq x$ . Hence $x\in Q$ . $\square$
The next example says that the set $Q$ is different from the union of all stable sets. A remaining
problem is whether the set $Q$ coincides or not with the union of all stable sets when there exists
a stable set.
Example 2.1. The 10-Person Game ( $L$nc&s (1969)). Let us consider the 10-person game:
$v(N)=5,$ $\cdot v(13579)=4,$ $t(3579)=v(1579)=v(1379)=3$ ,
$v(1479)=v(3679)=v(2579)=2,v(357)=v(157)=v(137)=2$,
$t(359)=v(159)=v(139)=2,$ $v(12)=\cdot v(34)=v(56)=v(78)=v(90)=1$ ,
$t(i)=0$ $\forall i\in N$
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and, for other $S,$ $c$ }$(S)=0$ . Let
$\mathcal{B}=\{x\in \mathcal{I}:x(12)=x(34)=x(56)=x(78)=x(90)=1, x_{i}\geq 0, \forall i\in N\}$.
It is easy to check that the core $C$ of this gaie is :
$C=\{x\in \mathcal{B}:x(13579)\geq 4\}$ .
Define the following subsets of $\mathcal{B}$ :
$\mathcal{E}_{1}=\{x\in \mathcal{B}:x_{3}=x_{5}=1, x_{1}<1, x(79)<1\}$ .
$\mathcal{E}_{3}=\{x\in \mathcal{B}:x_{5}=x_{1}=1, x_{3}<1, x(79)<1\}$ ,
$\mathcal{E}_{5}=\{x\in \mathcal{B}:x_{1}=x_{3}=1,X_{5}<\backslash 1, x(79)<1\}$ ,
$\mathcal{E}=\mathcal{E}_{1}\cup \mathcal{E}_{2}\cup \mathcal{E}_{3}$ ,
$\mathcal{F}_{36}=\{x\in \mathcal{B}:x(35)=1,x_{1}<1,x(79)\geq 1\}\backslash C$,
$\mathcal{F}_{51}=\{x\in \mathcal{B}:x(15)=1, x_{3}<1, x(79)\geq 1\}\backslash C$ ,
$\mathcal{F}_{13}=\{x\in \mathcal{B}:x(13)=1, x_{5}<1, x(79)\geq 1\}\backslash C$ ,
$\mathcal{F}_{7}=\{x\in \mathcal{B}:x_{7}=1, x_{9}<1, x(359)\geq 2,x(159)\geq 2,x(139)\geq 2\}\backslash C’$.
$\mathcal{F}_{9}=\{x\in \mathcal{B}:x_{(J}=1, x_{7}<1_{:}x(357)\geq 2,x(157)\geq 2, x(137)\geq 2\}\backslash C$ .
$\mathcal{F}_{79}=\{x\in \mathcal{B}:x_{7}=x_{9}=1\}\backslash C$ ,
$\mathcal{F}_{138}=\{x\in \mathcal{B}:x_{1}=x_{iJ}=x_{5}=1\}\backslash C$,
$\mathcal{F}=\mathcal{F}_{1a}\cup \mathcal{F}_{36}\cup \mathcal{F}_{61}\cup \mathcal{F}_{7}\cup \mathcal{F}_{9}\cup \mathcal{F}_{79}\cup \mathcal{F}_{135}$ .
It is well-known that
$\mathcal{I}\backslash \mathcal{B}$ , $\mathcal{B}\backslash (C\cup \mathcal{E}\cup \mathcal{F})$ , $C$ , $\mathcal{E}$ , $\mathcal{F}$
constitute a partition of $\mathcal{I}$ . It is known that
$\mathcal{I}\backslash (C\cup \mathcal{E}\cup \mathcal{F})\subset$ Dom $C$ ,
from which and from Proposition 2.3, we have Q C $C\cup \mathcal{E}\cup \mathcal{F}$. It is known that the set $C\cup \mathcal{F}$
is a subsolution, and so $C\cup \mathcal{F}\subseteq Q$ . Let’s see $\mathcal{E}\subset Q$ . Assume $x\in \mathcal{E}_{1}$ . If $y\succ x$ then $y\not\in C\cup \mathcal{F}$
since $\mathcal{E}\cap D_{ol}n(C\cup \mathcal{F})=\emptyset$ . So $y\in \mathcal{E}UD_{ol}nC$ . Suppose $y\in DomC$ . Then there exists
$z\in C$ such that $z\succ y$ . but $z\not\in x$ sinoe $\mathcal{E}\cap DomC=\emptyset$ . Hence $x\in Q$ . Suppose $y\in \mathcal{E}$ . Then
$y\in \mathcal{E}_{3}(\subset Dom\mathcal{E}_{5})$ . There exists $z\in \mathcal{E}_{5}$ such $that\approx\succ y$ , but $z\not\in x$ since $\mathcal{E}_{1}\cap Dom(\mathcal{E}_{1}\cup \mathcal{E}_{5})=\emptyset$.
Hence $x\in Q$ . So $\mathcal{E}_{1}\subset Q$ . By permutation, we see $\mathcal{E}_{3}\cup \mathcal{E}_{6}\subset Q$ . Consequently we have that
$Q=C\cup \mathcal{E}\cup \mathcal{F}$ . Note that the set $C\cup \mathcal{F}$ is a subsolution and it is the supercore2.
2See Roth (1976), esp. p.48.
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The next example says that the set $\mathcal{Q}$ is not always a convex set.
Example 2.2. (Lucas 1969) Let $n=8$ and
$v(N)=4,$ $v(1467)=2,v(12)=v(34)=v(56)=\cdot v(78)=1$
and $v(S)=0$ for all other $S$ . Let
$\mathcal{B}=\{x\in \mathcal{I}:x(12)=x(34)=x(56)=x(78)=1\}$ .
For $\prime i=1,4,6,7$ , let
$\mathcal{F}_{i}=\mathcal{B}\cap\{x\in \mathcal{I}:x_{i}=1\}$ .
The core is
$C=\{x\in \mathcal{B}:x(1467)\geq 2\}$ .
It is known that
$\mathcal{K}=C\cup \mathcal{F}_{1}\cup \mathcal{F}_{4}\cup \mathcal{F}_{6}\cup \mathcal{F}_{7}$
is a unique solution which is nonconvex. Let’s see $Q=\mathcal{K}$ . It is known that $\mathcal{I}\backslash \mathcal{B}\subseteq DomC$ ,
which implies $Q\subseteq \mathcal{B}$. Let $x\in \mathcal{B}\backslash \mathcal{K}$ . Then $x(1467)<2$ and $x_{i}<1$ for $i=1,4,6,7$ . Define
$y\in B$ by
$x_{i}<y_{i}<1$ , for $i=1,4,6,7,$ $y(1467)=2$ , and $y(i, i+1)=1$ , for $i=1,2,3,4$.
Then $y\succ x$ via {1, 4, 6, 7} and $y\in C$ . So $x\in$ DomC and $x\not\in Q$ . Hence $Q=\mathcal{K}$ .
3. A Subsolution and the Nucleolus
In this section we examine an inclusion relation between the nucleolus and the $Q$ .
Let $v$ be a game. For $x\in \mathcal{I}(v)$ let $\theta(x)$ be the $2^{n}$-vector whose components are the numbers
$e(S,x),$ $SC$ N. arranged in nonincreasing order, i.e.. $\theta(x)_{i}\geq\theta(x)_{j}$ whenever $1\leq i\leq j\leq 2^{\iota}$ .
We say that $\theta(x)$ is lexlcographically smaller than $\theta(y)$ , denoted $\theta(x)<\iota\theta(y)$ , if and only
if there is an index $k$ such that $\theta(x)_{i}=\theta(y)_{i}$ for all $i\cdot<k$ , and $\theta(x)_{k}<\theta(y)_{k}$ . We write
$\theta(x)\leq\iota\theta(y)$ for not $\theta(y)<L\theta(x)$ . The nucleolus for $v$ is the set $\mathcal{N}$ of vectors in $\mathcal{I}$ that
minimizes $\theta$ in the lexicographic ordering. i.e.,
$\mathcal{N}=$ { $x\in \mathcal{I}:\theta(x)\leq\iota\theta(y)$ for all $y\in \mathcal{I}$}.
It is known that the nucleolus is included in the core whenever the core is non-empty. So the
nucleolus is included in the set $Q$ by Proposition 2.3 whenever the core is non-empty. Since
the nucleolus satisfies the symmetry: Proposition 2.5 implies that the nucleolus is included in
the set $Q$ when the game is symmetric.
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Proposition 3.1. Assume $v(S)=0$ for $S$ such that $|S|\leq n-2$ . The nucleolus $\mathcal{N}$ is included
in the set $Q$ .
Proof: If $C\neq\emptyset$ it holds $\mathcal{N}\subseteq Q$ by Proposition 2.3 since it is known that N C $C$ . Assume
that $C=\emptyset$ . Let $\mathcal{N}=\{x^{*}\}$ . Without loss of generality assume
$e(N\backslash \{1\}, x^{*})\geq\ldots\geq e(\cdot N\backslash \{n\},x^{*})$ .
Since $x^{*}\not\in C$ there exists $y\in \mathcal{I}$ such that $y\succ x$ via $N\backslash \{i\}$ for $i\in N$ . Then
$\{\begin{array}{ll}e(N\backslash \{j\},y)>e(N\backslash \{1\},x^{*}), \forall j\neq i;e(N\backslash \{i\},x^{*})>e(N\backslash \{i\},y)\geq 0. \end{array}$
Assume $i\geq 2$ . $Define\approx\in \mathcal{I}$ by
$e(N\backslash \{j\}, z)=\{\begin{array}{ll}e(N\backslash \{j\}, y)+\epsilon, j\neq 1;e(N\backslash \{j\},x^{*})-(n-1)\epsilon, j=1,\end{array}$
so that $e(N\backslash \{1\}, x^{*})-(n-1)\epsilon\geq 0$ and $e(N\backslash \{i\}, y)+\epsilon\leq e(N\backslash \{i\},x^{*})$ . That is,
$0< \epsilon\leq\min\{\frac{e(N\backslash \{1\},x^{*})}{n-1}, e(N\backslash \{i\}, x^{*})-e(N\backslash \{i\}, y)\}$ .
We have $z\succ y\backslash \prime iaN\backslash \{1\}$ . In order for $z$ to dominate $x^{*}$ , it must dominate only via $N\backslash \{1\}$ .
This is impossible because $e,(N\backslash \{i\}, z)\leq e(N\backslash \{i\}, x^{*})$ . So $z\not\in x^{*}$ .
Next \"assume $i=1$ . Assume $e(N\backslash \{1\},x^{*})>e(N\backslash \{2\}, x^{*})$ . Since the nucleolus satisfies,
what is called, Property $I^{3}$ , we must have $x_{1}^{*}=v(1)=0$ . Then $e(N\backslash \{1\},x^{*})>e(N\backslash \{1\},y)\geq 0$ ,
which implies $y_{1}<0$ contradicting $y\in \mathcal{I}$. Helice we have $e(N\backslash \{1\},x^{t})=e(N\backslash \{2\},x^{*})$ .
Exchalige $e(N\backslash \{2\},x^{*})$ with $e(N\backslash \{1\}, x^{*})$ . Then it reduces to the ca.se $i=2$ . $\square$
4. Remarks
For 3-person games, by Proposition 3.1, the nucleolus is included in the set $Q$ and also the
reader could see that the set $Q$ coincides with the union of all stable sets.
It is interesting to examine whether the nucleolus is included in the set $Q$ or not for broader
classes of games.
$\overline{3s_{eef_{01\epsilon x\iota n\iota}1e,pp.328- 332}:1)}$of Owen(1905).
137
References
Lucas,W.F.:The proof that a game may not have a solution. Trans.American Mathematical
Society,137 (1969), pp.219-229.
Lucas,W.F.:Games with unique solutions that are nonconvex. Pacific Joumal of Mathemat-
ics,28 (1969), pp.599-602.
Milnor,J.W.: Reasonable outcomes for n-person games. Rh1-916, RAND Corporation,1952.
Owen,G.: Game Theory. Academic P. 1995.
Roth,A.E.: Subsolutions and the supercore of cooperative games. Mathematics of Operations
Resaerch 1(1976), pp.43-49.
138
